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Responsibility for a social choice that yields a low outcome for a partner produces interpersonal guilt, experienced by the decision-maker as a larger decrease in momentary happiness than when the partner made the same choice, and this guilt has identifiable neural mechanisms.

claim_type hypothesisrole hypothesisconfidence tentativespan abstract-001evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

addresses “What are the neural mechanisms of interpersonal guilt and responsibility evoked by social decisions under risk?”

evidence “This study investigated the neural mechanisms involved in feelings of interpersonal guilt and responsibility evoked by social decisions in humans.”

notes “Stated as the study's guiding proposition via the abstract aim and the operational definition of guilt rather than an explicit 'we hypothesize'.”

The anterior insula is the neural substrate of the guilt effect, increasing its BOLD response when participants are responsible for low outcomes affecting their partner.

claim_type hypothesisrole hypothesisconfidence tentativespan results-086evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

addresses “Which neural substrate tracks the interpersonal guilt effect?”

evidence “Next, we sought to uncover the neural mechanisms associated with our guilt effect and those involved in tracking consequences of participants’ decisions on their partner.”

notes “The insula-as-guilt-substrate proposition, pursued given prior literature; stated as an aim and later as a result rather than an explicit hypothesis.”

Functional connectivity between guilt- and responsibility-related outcome-phase regions and prefrontal cortex changes depending on whether participants decide for themselves alone or also for their partner, and on the type of choice (Safe or Risky).

claim_type hypothesisrole hypothesisconfidence highspan results-140evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

addresses “Does functional connectivity between guilt/responsibility regions and prefrontal cortex change with the social decision context?”

evidence “We hypothesized that connectivity with regions that showed guilt- and responsibility-related responses during the outcome phase (see previous paragraph) might change depending on whether participants made decisions for themselves only or for themselves and their partner, and depending on the type of choice ( Safe or Ri…”

If responsibility for outcomes generates guilt, then participant happiness should decrease more after low lottery outcomes for the partner when the participant rather than the partner chose the lottery.

claim_type predictionrole predictionconfidence tentativespan results-119evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “In our definition, guilt occurs due to responsibility for low lottery outcomes for the partner.”

notes “Written as the conditional deduced from the guilt hypothesis; the paper states it as an operational definition and then tests it.”

If the anterior insula tracks guilt, then insula BOLD should be higher in the Social than the Partner condition and show a significant Social-by-low-outcome interaction.

claim_type predictionrole predictionconfidence tentativespan results-124evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “To identify regions likely to be involved in the guilt effect, we selected those satisfying two conditions: higher activity in the Social compared to the Partner condition, and a significant Social:LowOutcome interaction.”

notes “Phrased as the prediction the insula hypothesis commits the paper to; the text states it as the region-selection criteria.”

A landmark study found that most participants displayed responsibility aversion in decisions affecting a group — an effect not explained by guilt — implicating medial prefrontal cortex, anterior insula and temporo-parietal junction.

claim_type interpretiverole literature-contextconfidence highspan introduction-026evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Interestingly, most participants displayed responsibility aversion, and this effect could not be explained by guilt, suggesting people associate a psychological cost with assuming responsibility for others’ outcomes.”

notes “Prior-work premise (Edelson et al., 2018) the paper builds on and distinguishes its guilt account from.”

A multivariate reanalysis established a neural signature for guilt with key regions including anterior medial cingulate cortex, insula, inferior frontal gyrus, inferior temporal cortex, thalamus and cerebellum.

claim_type interpretiverole literature-contextconfidence highspan introduction-018evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “A multivariate reanalysis of these two datasets revealed a neural signature for guilt ( Yu et al., 2020 ), with key regions including the anterior medial cingulate cortex, insula, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), inferior temporal cortex, thalamus, and cerebellum.”

notes “Prior-work premise (Yu et al., 2020) that the paper's convergent-validity GRBS analysis inherits.”

Participants’ probability of choosing the risky option (lottery) increased with the difference between the expected value of the lottery and the value of the safe option (Study 1: t(4796)=9.26, p<3.1e-20, β=0.074; Study 2: t(3829)=10.62, p<5.3e-26, β=0.093).

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evidence “participants’ probability of choosing the risky option (lottery) increased with the difference between the expected value of the lottery and the value of the safe option (Study 1: Figure 2A , t (4796) = 9.26, p < 3.1e –20 , β = 0.074, 95% CI = [0.059 0.090]; Study 2: Figure 2D , t (3829) = 10.62, p < 5.3e –26 , β = 0.0…”

notes “Manipulation check that choices tracked expected value as intended.”

Participants chose the lottery more often in the Solo condition than in the Social condition in Study 1 (t(4796)=2.54, p=0.011, β=0.164) but not in Study 2 (t(3829)=0.23, p=0.82, β=0.015).

panel fig2a,fig2dclaim_type empiricalrole empiricalconfidence highspan results-006evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Participants chose the lottery more often in the Solo condition than in the Social condition in Study 1 ( t (4796) = 2.54, p = 0.011, β = 0.164, 95% CI = [0.038 0.291]), but this difference was not found in Study 2 ( t (3829) = 0.23, p = 0.82, β = 0.015, 95% CI = [–0.109 0.138]).”

There was no significant interaction between the difference in expected values and experimental conditions in either study (p > 0.52).

claim_type empiricalrole controlconfidence highspan results-007evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “There was no significant interaction between the difference in expected values and experimental conditions in either study (p > 0.52).”

notes “Null result.”

Risk premiums did not differ between Social and Solo conditions (Study 1: t(39)=1.53, p=0.134, d=0.24, BF10=0.49; Study 2: t(43)=-0.21, p=0.84, d=-0.03, BF10=0.17).

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evidence “Risk premiums did not differ between Social and Solo conditions (Study 1: Figure 2B , t (39) = 1.53, p = 0.134, Cohen’s d = 0.24, BF 10 = 0.49; Study 2: Figure 2E , t (43) = –0.21, p = 0.84, d = –0.03, BF 10 = 0.17).”

notes “Null result; evidence against social-context-driven changes in risk aversion.”

The risk-aversion parameter ρ did not differ between gain and loss trials (Study 1: t(17)=0.21, p=0.84, d=0.05; Study 2: t(15)=-0.61, p=0.55, d=0.15).

claim_type empiricalrole controlconfidence highspan results-025evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “As ρ did not vary between gain and loss trials (Study 1: t (17) = 0.21, p = 0.84, d = 0.05; Study 2: t (15) = –0.61, p = 0.55, d = 0.15; paired t -test)”

notes “Null result justifying pooling across gain and loss trials.”

Participants were slightly more risk averse (higher ρ) in the Social than the Solo condition in Study 1 (t(39)=2.27, p=0.03, d=0.36, BF10=1.69) but not in Study 2 (t(43)=1.40, p=0.17, d=0.21, BF10=0.41).

panel fig2c,fig2fclaim_type empiricalrole empiricalconfidence highspan results-026evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “We found that participants were slightly more risk averse in the Social than in the Solo condition in Study 1 ( Figure 2C , t (39) = 2.27, p = 0.03, d = 0.36, BF 10 = 1.69) but not in Study 2”

Participants showed very similar risk preferences whether deciding only for themselves (Solo) or for themselves and their partner (Social), with only a tendency toward higher risk aversion in the Social condition in Study 1.

claim_type synthesisrole synthesisconfidence highspan results-028evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “In sum, participants showed very similar risk preferences when making decisions affecting only themselves ( Solo condition) or themselves and their partner ( Social condition), with a tendency towards higher risk aversion in the Social condition in Study 1.”

In both studies, participant momentary happiness correlated with the rewards obtained in the current trial by both the participant and the partner.

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evidence “Across all trials, in both studies, participant momentary happiness correlated with rewards obtained in the current trial by the participant and by the partner”

Rutledge and colleagues established that changes in momentary happiness during a probabilistic reward task are explained by recent reward expectations and the prediction errors arising from them.

claim_type interpretiverole literature-contextconfidence highspan results-046evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Following Rutledge and colleagues’ methodology, which considers that changes in momentary happiness in response to outcomes of a probabilistic reward task are explained by the combined influence of recent reward expectations and prediction errors arising from those expectations, we fitted computational models to each p…”

notes “Prior-work premise the modelling approach inherits.”

A likelihood ratio test showed the Responsibility model fitted the happiness data better than all other models, including the Responsibility Redux model (Study 1: all LR≥47.36, p<0.0001; Study 2: all LR≥77.83, p<0.0001).

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evidence “a likelihood ratio test ( Equation 9 ) revealed that the Responsibility model fitted better than all the other models, including the Responsibility Redux model (Study 1: all LR ≥47.36, p < 0.0001; Study 2: all LR ≥77.83, p < 0.0001).”

The Responsibility model yielded higher R2 values than all other models (Study 1: all t>3.6, p<0.007; Study 2: all t>2.9, p<0.034), except the Guilt-envy model in Study 1 (t=2.19, p=0.17).

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evidence “The Responsibility model yielded higher R 2 values than all the other models (Study 1: all t > 3.6, p < 0.007; Study 2: all t > 2.9, p < 0.034; Bonferroni-corrected t -tests) except for the Guilt-envy model in the data of Study 1 ( t = 2.19, p = 0.17).”

Participants’ own reward prediction errors (sRPE) influenced happiness more than the partner’s reward prediction errors, whether resulting from participant or partner choices (Study 1: all Z>6.0, p<0.001; Study 2: all Z>3.7, p<0.003).

claim_type empiricalrole empiricalconfidence highspan results-067evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “weights for sRPE were higher than for social_pRPE or partner_pRPE (Study 1: all Z > 6.0, p < 0.001; Study 2: all Z > 3.7, p < 0.003).”

The partner’s reward prediction errors resulting from the participants’ own choices (social_pRPE) had weights greater than 0 (Responsibility model: Study 1: Z=2.85, p=0.004; Study 2: Z=3.26, p=0.001), contributing to explaining momentary happiness.

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evidence “weights for social_pRPE were greater than 0: Responsibility model : Study 1: Z = 2.85, p = 0.004, Study 2: Z = 3.26, p = 0.001”

The stability of the estimated computational-model parameters was verified with a parameter-recovery procedure.

panel fig3s1claim_type assessmentrole methodologicalconfidence highspan results-068evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “The stability of these estimated parameters was verified using a parameter recovery procedure (see Methods and Figure 3—figure supplement 1 ).”

Participant happiness was lower when the participant was the decision-maker (Social + Solo vs. Partner), independent of outcome (Study 1: t(3600)=-3.92, p<0.0001, β=-0.14; Study 2: t(2870)=-6.07, p<0.0001, β=-0.24).

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evidence “found happiness to be lower when the participant chose, independent of the outcome (Study 1: t (3600) = –3.92, p < 0.0001, β = –0.14, 95% CI = [−0.20 to 0.07]; Study 2: t (2870) = –6.07, p < 0.0001, β = –0.24, 95% CI = [−0.31 to 0.16]).”

The lower happiness when the participant is the decision-maker may reflect responsibility aversion — a cost of the ‘weight of the responsibility’.

claim_type interpretiverole interpretationconfidence highspan results-073evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “This is interesting in itself and may reflect the drive behind responsibility aversion reported by Edelson et al.’s 2018 study: being assigned the role of the decider in a social setting may make people slightly unhappy, perhaps due to ‘weight of the responsibility’.”

The interaction between partner outcome and decision-maker was significant (Study 1: t(1180)=3.52, p=0.0004, β=0.37; Study 2: t(937)=2.85, p=0.0045, β=0.33): when the partner received the low outcome, participant happiness was lower when the participant rather than the partner had chosen the lottery.

panel fig3d,fig3hclaim_type empiricalrole empiricalconfidence highspan results-076evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Crucially, the interaction between partner outcome and decision-maker was significant (Study 1: t (1180) = 3.52, p = 0.0004, β = 0.37, 95% CI = [0.16 0.58]; Study 2: t (937) = 2.85, p = 0.0045, β = 0.33, 95% CI = [0.10 0.56]).”

notes “The core behavioural 'guilt effect'.”

The behavioural guilt effect (larger happiness decrease after low partner outcomes following participant rather than partner choices) is compatible with ‘simple guilt’.

claim_type interpretiverole interpretationconfidence highspan results-080evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “This behavioural effect (difference in happiness obtained when the partner received low lottery outcomes after participant rather than partner choices) is thus compatible with ‘simple guilt’, and we will thus refer to it as ‘guilt effect’.”

The guilt effect occurred whether the participant received the high lottery outcome (Study 1: t(39)=-3.58, p<0.001, d=0.56; Study 2: t(43)=-2.68, p=0.01, d=0.4) or the low outcome (Study 1: t(39)=-3.39, p=0.002, d=0.54; Study 2: t(43)=-3.58, p<0.001, d=0.54).

claim_type empiricalrole controlconfidence highspan results-081evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “The ‘guilt effect’ occurred whether the participant received the high lottery outcome (Study 1: t (39) = –3.58, p < 0.001, d = 0.56, BF 10 = 32; Study 2: t (43) = –2.68, p = 0.01, d = 0.4, BF 10 = 3.8) or the low lottery outcome (Study 1: t (39) = –3.39, p = 0.002, d = 0.54, BF 10 = 19; Study 2: t (43) = –3.58, p < 0.0…”

notes “Shows the guilt effect does not depend on the participant's own outcome, strengthening the guilt interpretation.”

Responsibility for choices did not influence happiness following positive (high) lottery outcomes for the partner (both studies, all |t|<1.3, p>0.2, BF10<0.2).

claim_type empiricalrole controlconfidence highspan results-083evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Responsibility for choices did not influence happiness following positive lottery outcomes for the partner (both studies, all | t| < 1.3, p > 0.2, BF 10 < 0.2).”

notes “Null result establishing the guilt effect is specific to negative partner outcomes.”

In both studies, participants felt worse after low lottery outcomes for the partner when those outcomes followed their own choice rather than the partner’s, which the authors interpret as interpersonal guilt.

claim_type synthesisrole synthesisconfidence highspan results-085evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Within these outcomes, participants felt worse following low lottery outcomes for the partner if those outcomes were consequences of their own choice rather than the partner’s, which we interpret as interpersonal guilt.”

All BOLD/fMRI results derive from Study 2 (the fMRI study, N=44), whereas the behavioural results come from both Study 1 (N=40) and Study 2.

claim_type assessmentrole scopeconfidence highspan results-087evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “using the fMRI data collected in Study 2.”

notes “Scope condition on which results are neural.”

The bilateral ventral striatum was more active when participants chose the risky rather than the safe option (Cohen’s d=0.72 left, 0.85 right), replicating previous findings.

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evidence “found such responses in the bilateral ventral striatum (Cohen’s d = 0.72 and 0.85 in the left and right clusters, respectively; Figure 4A and Appendix 1—table 3 ), which replicates previous findings ( Cui et al., 2022 ; Preuschoff et al., 2006 ).”

notes “Replication of a known risk-related effect, validating the imaging/analysis.”

Decisions in the Social compared with the Solo condition engaged three clusters — the precuneus (d=0.79), left temporo-parietal junction (d=0.59), and medial prefrontal cortex (d=0.54).

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evidence “Three significant clusters of voxels were identified ( Figure 4B and Appendix 1—table 3 ), in the precuneus ( d = 0.79), the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; d = 0.59) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; d = 0.54).”

Only the precuneus and TPJ showed positive Risky–Safe differences in both the Social>Solo and Social>Partner comparisons, being most active when participants chose the lottery in the Social condition.

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evidence “Only the precuneus and TPJ showed positive differences in both comparisons ( Figure 4C ), indicating that these regions were most active when participants chose the lottery in the Social condition, the critical situation in which participants assume responsibility over others.”

During receipt of lottery versus safe outcomes, clusters were more active in the bilateral anterior insula, dmPFC, right STS, bilateral ventral striatum, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and bilateral inferior parietal lobe.

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evidence “A cluster of voxels more active during receipt of lottery outcomes than outcomes of safe choices was identified in the bilateral anterior insula, dorsal mPFC (dmPFC), right superior temporal sulcus (STS), bilateral ventral striatum, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and bilateral inferior parietal lobe ( Figure 4D ”

The insula ROIs responded more to low lottery outcomes for the partner in the Social than the Partner condition (even after subtracting responses to high outcomes), mirroring the behavioural guilt effect.

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evidence “Thus, activation in our insula ROIs increased in situations during which participants experienced guilt for low outcomes impacting their partner, compared to similar outcomes resulting from the partner’s choices.”

A mass-univariate voxel-wise analysis found a small left anterior insula cluster (peak T=3.95, d=0.59, 22 voxels) responding more to low partner outcomes following participant than partner choices, surviving small-volume family-wise-error correction (p=0.024).

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evidence “We found a weak response in a small cluster within the left anterior insula (peak T = 3.95, d = 0.59, 22 voxels, peak intensity at [–28 24 –4]; Figure 4F ).”

notes “The small-volume FWE correction (p=0.024) is reported in the following sentence; the authors note it is consistent with the mixed-model analysis.”

Prior literature documents an association between the anterior insula and guilt.

claim_type interpretiverole literature-contextconfidence highspan results-130evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Given the documented association between anterior insula and guilt (see Introduction)”

notes “Inherited premise motivating the insula small-volume correction.”

The ‘Responsibility’ computational model was used to generate expected BOLD responses per participant for the model-based fMRI analysis.

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evidence “We used the model to create expected BOLD responses for each participant (see Methods) and as a manipulation check searched for responses in ventral striatum evoked by participant rewards”

notes “The model-based STS result depends on this model-derived regressor.”

As a manipulation check, bilateral ventral striatum activation increased with expected certain rewards and the expected values of chosen lotteries (left: pFWE=0.002, T=5.63, d=0.75; right: pFWE=0.005, T=5.46, d=0.70).

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evidence “We found that activation in bilateral ventral striatum indeed increased with the amount of expected certain rewards and the expected values of chosen lotteries (left: p FWE = 0.002, T = 5.63, d = 0.75, Z = 5.41, 110 voxels, peak at MNI [–14 8 –8], right: p FWE = 0.005, T = 5.46, d = 0.70, Z = 5.26, 80 voxels, peak at M…”

notes “Manipulation check validating the model-based BOLD analysis.”

One cluster in the left STS responded more to partner reward prediction errors resulting from participant rather than partner choices (pFWE=0.022, T=4.70, d=0.53, 100 voxels, peak MNI [-52 -32 0]).

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evidence “We found this effect in one cluster within the left STS (p FWE = 0.022, T = 4.70, d = 0.53, Z = 4.57, 100 voxels, peak at MNI [−52 –32 0]; Figure 4H ).”

The authors suggest this left STS region tracks a partner’s unexpected outcomes less when they do not follow from the participant’s decisions.

claim_type interpretiverole interpretationconfidence highspan results-138evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “This finding suggests that this region of the left STS tracks a partner’s unexpected outcomes less when they do not follow from the participant’s decisions.”

Prior functional connectivity work has shown network differences between social and self-only choices, midbrain–anterior cingulate interactions during guilt compensation, and links between insula connectivity and responsibility aversion.

claim_type interpretiverole literature-contextconfidence highspan results-139evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Functional connectivity analyses have revealed differences in networks engaged by social and self-only choices ( Jung et al., 2013 ; Ogawa et al., 2018 ), interactions between midbrain and anterior cingulate during compensation for guilt ( Yu et al., 2014 ), and links between insula connectivity and responsibility aver…”

notes “Prior-work premises motivating the connectivity analysis.”

Left anterior insula connectivity with a right IFG cluster was highest when participants made Risky choices for themselves and Safe choices for both players (pFWE=0.020, T=4.34, d=0.80, 115 voxels, peak MNI [46 16 22]).

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evidence “The first analysis revealed a cluster in the right IFG whose connectivity to the insula (the seed region) was highest when participants made Risky choices for themselves and Safe choices for both players (p FWE = 0.020, T = 4.34, d = 0.80, Z = 4.21, 115 voxels, peak at MNI [46 16 22]; Figure 5 ).”

A left IFG cluster showed the opposite pattern of connectivity with the left STS seed — highest for Safe-self / Risky-both-players choices — but did not survive correction for multiple comparisons (p uncorrected=0.001, T=4.44, 35 voxels).

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evidence “The second analysis revealed a smaller cluster in the left IFG that did not survive corrections for multiple tests, where connectivity with the left STS (the seed region) showed the opposite pattern: connectivity was highest when participants made Safe choices for themselves and Risky choices for both players (p uncorr…”

notes “Did not survive multiple-comparison correction.”

Connectivity between the left anterior insula and the right inferior frontal gyrus varied with choice and condition, suggesting this prefrontal region is sensitive to guilt-related information during social choices.

claim_type interpretiverole interpretationconfidence highspan abstract-009evidence_verified trueevidence_verified_against span

evidence “Connectivity between this region and the right inferior frontal gyrus varied depending on choice and experimental condition, suggesting that this part of prefrontal cortex is sensitive to guilt-related information during social choices.”

notes “Interpretation stated in the abstract.”

Dot products between individual neural guilt responses and the Yu et al. (2020) guilt-related brain signature (GRBS) were overall positive (mean=5.22, median=6.97, sign test p=0.017, Cliff’s Delta=0.4).

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evidence “The dot products between individual responses and the GRBS varied between –40.1 and 36.7, but overall these values were positive (mean = 5.22; median = 6.97; sign test: p = 0.017; Cliff’s Delta = 0.4 = medium effect size; data are not normally distributed).”

notes “Convergent validity with a previously published neural guilt signature.”

Individual GRBS dot-product values did not correlate with the behavioural guilt responses (Spearman’s Rho=-0.058, p=0.725).

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evidence “We assessed whether inter-individual differences in these dot product values correlated with the behavioural guilt responses, but did not find a significant association [ Spearman’s Rho = –0.058, p = 0.725].”

notes “Null result: the neural signature does not track individual differences in behavioural guilt sensitivity.”